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Introduction 
  Over the past several decades, the United States Supreme Court has provided greater 
guidance on the preemptive effect of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or Act).
1 
The decisions in some of these cases have invited controversy and criticism because of the 
consequent effects on the plaintiff’s ability to seek recourse for injuries due to dangerous 
products that are regulated under the Act. One of the threshold legal inquiries centers on whether 
common law state tort claims and their associated jury verdicts constitute “requirements” or 
“regulations” that can be expressly or impliedly preempted by federal regulations.
2  
  In its first major preemption ruling under the FDCA, the Supreme Court held that state 
tort claims involving medical devices approved through the premarket notice procedure were not 
preempted.
3 A four-Justice plurality practically scoffed at the idea that Congress intended to 
foreclose any remedies for consumers or that traditional state tort claims were “requirements” 
within the meaning of the preemption clause for medical devices.
4 According to these Justices, 
“if Congress intended to preclude all common-law causes of action, it chose a singularly odd 
word with which to do it.”
5 Furthermore, such a conclusion is “implausible” because it would 
mean that “Congress would have barred most, if not all, relief for persons injured by defective 
medical devices.”
6 
                                                 
1 The fact that the last two years have seen a flurry of preemption cases is in no doubt due to the proactive stance of 
the FDA to seek the force of preemption for its pharmaceutical drug labeling regulations. See Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 504-505 (2008) (describing 
the FDA’s intervention in relevant preemption cases and the express preemption statement in its drug labeling 
regulation). 
2 For an early discussion of this question by the Court, see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 535-36 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). As will be discussed in 
Part III, infra, another legal inquiry focuses on what constitutes a “federal regulation” as well, particularly with 
respect to a medical device and its governing preemption clause. 
3 Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). Note that this holding would also apply to “grandfathered” Class III 
medical devices that were already on the market before being regulated by the FDA. 
4 See id. at 487 (labeling such arguments as both “unpersuasive” and “implausible”). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 2 
 
  By 2008, the Court had retreated from its apparent position of safeguarding an avenue for 
compensatory relief for injured consumers.
7 In Riegel v. Medtronic, eight Justices ruled that FDA 
regulations governing Class III medical devices preempt state tort claims because such claims 
do, indeed, constitute “requirements.”
8 Remarkably, three of the Justices from the plurality in 
Lohr joined the majority in Riegel. These Justices had previously rejected the interpretation that 
state tort claims constitute “requirements” because such a reading would have the “perverse 
effect of granting complete immunity” to the medical device industry.
9  
  The Court’s recent, and almost unanimous, view that a state tort law decision constitutes 
a requirement or regulation for the manufacturer has important consequences. Pharmaceutical 
drug regulations, which do not include an express preemption provision from Congress, may 
nevertheless impliedly preempt state tort claims if “compliance” with them would cause the 
manufacturer to violate a federal regulation. Thus, consumers may be left with no legal remedy if 
they are harmed by medical devices or pharmaceutical drugs.
10 This result overturns the long 
history and direction of the common law and ignores one of its singular purposes: to compensate 
injured victims so that they do not bear the costs incurred by another’s conduct. 
   The purpose of this paper is to address the unjust reality in which many consumers who 
are injured by pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices are left uncompensated. Part I describes 
the history and compensatory function of tort law, which was ignored by the Supreme Court in 
its recent preemption decisions. Part II summarizes the introduction of notable federal statutes 
that govern pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices, as well as the peaceful co-existence with 
                                                 
7 Indeed, one commentator described the change in the Court’s position from Lohr to Medtronic as a “180-degree 
turnabout.” Sharkey, supra note 1, at 504-505. 
8 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999 (2008).  
9 Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996).  
10 While the anti-preemption advocates achieved a victory in the Court’s recent decision in Wyeth v. Levine, 
governing pharmaceutical drugs, I discuss in Part III why its ruling may be substantially limited.  3 
 
the state tort system. Part III analyzes the reasoning and outcomes of notable Supreme Court 
cases bearing on the preemptive effect of the FDCA. It then provides some criticism of the 
Court’s inconsistent and misguided interpretation of the nature of state tort law. Finally, Part IV 
suggests several alternatives to the current system that may be more fair to injured individuals 
and would help alleviate concerns of both manufacturers and the FDA. 
I. The History and Development of Tort Law 
A. The Evolutions of Torts 
  1. Early History 
  The concept of compensating individuals for injuries caused by others  has been in 
practice for time immemorial.
11 In relevance to modern American tort law, the legal 
requirements to pay for damages trace back to English common law beginning in the 13th 
century.
12 While there is some controversy among legal historians concerning the precise genesis 
of early precedents to modern tort claims,
13 it is generally agreed that liability began with actions 
of trespass and trespass on the case, respectively.
14 An action for trespass concerned a breach of 
the King’s peace by the direct injury to a person or his property.
15 The defendant in such cases 
was fined by the court and later was forced to directly compensate the injured individual as 
well.
16  
The action of trespass on the case, or “sur le cas” as it was originally known, emerged to 
provide justice to individuals who had suffered a loss, but could not bring a proper action for 
                                                 
11 See George Woodbine, Origins of the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE L.J. 799, 812 - 813 (1923) (admitting that no 
conclusive evidence exists concerning the exact origins of the legal right to recover monetary damages in English 
common law, but nevertheless arguing that Roman law is the most likely source). 
12 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 6, at 29 (5th ed. 1984). 
13 See Elizabeth Jean Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE L.J. 1142, 1142 - 1145 (1937). 
14 KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 6, at 29. 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  4 
 
trespass.
17 Trespass only concerned direct injuries caused by the plaintiff. The King’s Court, 
however, recognized that oftentimes injuries occur as the result of indirect actions or even 
inactions of the defendant.
18 In other words, with an action of trespass on the case, plaintiffs 
could press for damages as a result of the defendant’s negligence. In either form of action, the 
“element of damages seems to have been the chief invigorating force behind the origin and 
development of trespass.”
19 Gradually, by the 19th century, courts had delineated between 
intentional torts, most of which fell under an action for trespass, and negligent torts.
20 
  2. Rise of Strict Liability 
  One prerequisite development was required before a claim under a theory of strict 
liability could even be fathomed. This foundation started in the mid-19th century when courts 
began to carve out an exception to the “privity of contract” rule that had previously been 
necessary to establish a duty of care under a claim based on negligence. In Thomas v. 
Winchester, the defendant manufacturer of medicinal plant extracts mislabeled a bottle of the 
relatively toxic belladonna extract, so that it appeared to contain the generally harmless extract of 
dandelion.
21 The plaintiff was severely injured when she mistakenly ingested what would have 
been an appropriate amount of dandelion extract from the mislabeled bottle.
22 The New York 
Court of Appeals held that the defendant manufacturer could be liable to third parties not in 
                                                 
17 See Dix, supra note 13, at 1155. 
18 In an age when proper procedure and forms were absolutely necessary in order to allow an action for damages to 
proceed, the courts appear to have created the “special writ” of trespass on the case to allow a cause of action for 
another’s negligent acts. Several cases from the 14th century survive in which the court distinguishes the two forms 
of trespass. In Waldon v. Marshall, a doctor unsuccessfully attempted to cure the plaintiff’s horse, which 
subsequently died because of his negligence. The court stated that an action for trespass was not permissible because 
the doctor did not directly kill the horse. The court then proceeded to acknowledge a “special writ according to the 
case, . . . for we can have no other writ.” In another case, the court distinguished between an innkeeper who directly 
steals a guest’s property, and one who negligently fails to adequately protect the property from theft. See id. at 1155 
& note 62.  
19 Woodbine, supra note 11, at 802. 
20 KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 6, at 30. 
21 6 N.Y. 397, 405 (1852). 
22 Id.  5 
 
privity of contract on the grounds that harm to the consumer is “the natural and almost inevitable 
consequence of” improperly prepared therapeutic drugs.
23 According to the court, it would be 
unjust not to create an exception in these types of cases because the one injured by the 
manufacturer’s negligence is the patient and not the pharmacist, who traditionally is the only 
party in privity of contract.
24 The court emphasized that its holding only pertained to products 
that may “put human life in imminent danger.”
25 Ultimately, the court attached an expanded duty 
of care to the manufacturer of drugs because these products have the potential to cause serious 
bodily harm and the vast majority of individuals who would be injured by defective or 
mislabeled drugs would not be in privity of contract with the manufacturer. 
In 1916, the New York Court of Appeals further eroded and essentially “buried the 
general rule” of privity of contract that was ordinarily necessary to establish a duty of reasonable 
care between two parties.
26 In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., the court extended the 
classification of products that could pose an imminent danger to human life to anything that “is 
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made.”
27 Thus, the expanded, 
but limited, duty created in Thomas v. Winchester was interpreted quite broadly by the court. 
One need not employ his or her skills of imagination long to discover that practically any product 
can pose an imminent danger if negligently made. The court, however, was generally undeterred 
by this potential expansion of liability. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the majority, stated: “We 
have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of 
                                                 
23 Id. at 408-409. 
24 See id. at 409-410. 
25 See id. at 409. 
26 See William L. Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 
(1960) [hereinafter Assault upon the Citadel]. 
27 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (applying the newly expanded duty of care between a manufacturer of 
automobiles and the purchaser and passengers). 6 
 
negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else.”
28 And so, having begun the 
attack on the “citadel of privity” in tort law, courts started the foundation for actions in strict 
liability.
29 
While the courts were busy subsuming the rule of privity of contract in negligence cases, 
they had also begun to recognize a limited form of strict liability that applied to food and drink.
30 
Indeed, this concept traced back to the 15th century in England, though privity of contract was 
still a necessary component for recovery of damages at that time.
31 Gradually, courts began to 
expand strict liability to products that were intended for “intimate bodily use,” such as personal 
hygiene products.
32 Finally, in 1960, the New Jersey Supreme Court held the manufacturer of an 
automobile liable for a defect in its steering mechanism, despite the lack of privity of contract or 
any evidence showing negligence.
33 Soon after, in 1963, the California Supreme Court, via Judge 
Traynor, unequivocally endorsed and rationalized strict liability for defective products.
34 Many 
other states quickly followed suit,
35 necessitating several revisions to the ongoing draft of the 
second Restatement of Torts.
36  
B. Principles of Tort Liability 
  Throughout the history and development of tort law, a trend can clearly be discerned in 
which courts have abandoned rigid principles of law and adopted more liberal principles that 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 See Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 26, at 1099 (quoting Justice Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 
N.Y. 170, 180 (1931)). 
30 See id. at 1110. 
31 See id. at 1104. Note that criminal statutes for food and drink had been enacted as far back as the 13th century in 
England, when the actions for trespass and trespass on the case were being established. See id. at 1103. 
32 See id. at 1111-12. Note that this expansion occurred at the expense of traditional causes of action based on a 
breach of warranty, which also required privity of contract. See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case 
against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 853, 859 (1983).  
33 See William L. Prosser, Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 793 (1966) 
[hereinafter Fall of the Citadel] (discussing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)). 
34 See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 829 (1973) (describing 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)). 
35 Fall of the Citadel, supra note 33, at 793-795. 
36 Id. at 793 n.9. 7 
 
extend the availability of remedies to injured consumers. By no longer requiring privity of 
contract to establish a duty, the common law had evolved in order to protect and compensate 
those individuals who were most likely to be injured by defective products. The establishment of 
strict liability made it even easier for injured individuals to recover damages, since they no 
longer needed to establish negligence on the part of the manufacturer. 
  By the time tort actions for negligence had become common place, scholars recognized 
that “the purpose of the law of torts is to . . . afford compensation for injuries sustained by one 
person as the result of the conduct of another.”
37 Strict products liability, while furthering some 
additional objectives, did not alter the well-established compensatory function of tort law; 
indeed, it further enabled the recovery of damages for injuries that had previously been barred 
for lack of privity.
38 Judge Traynor reasoned that unsuspecting consumers should have “general 
and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection.”
39 
  By the 1970’s, scholars had begun a new and lively debate over the objectives of tort law. 
Judge Posner and the economic school viewed tort law as a deterrent device that would minimize 
injuries in society.
40 Alternatively, a competing school of thought believed that tort law serves as 
a “corrective justice” system in which moral rights are vindicated.
41 Both views, however, fail to 
address how they remain relevant in modern society, where insurance and even re-insurance 
companies abound.
42 The deterrence theory, in which the threat of liability causes manufacturers 
to take precautionary safety measures, is undermined by the insurance policies that all 
                                                 
37 Cecil A Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238 (1944).  
38 Professor Prosser and Judge Traynor particularly espoused strict liability for its “risk-spreading” effects; that is, a 
manufacturer should absorb the cost of injuries (to unsuspecting individuals) resulting from its products and then 
pass these losses on to the general public. See Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 26, at 1120; Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).  
39 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).  
40 Jeffrey O’Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in Personal Injury Tort Law: A 
Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah, 32 CONN. L. REV. 137, 138-139 (2000). 
41 Id. 
42 See id.  8 
 
manufacturers now carry.
43 In other words, any additional safety measures that the threat of 
liability would have imposed on a manufacturer is practically negated by the knowledge that the 
award money would come from an insurance company. Furthermore, evidence suggests that 
insurance premiums do not appreciably rise for manufacturers who are found liable for injuries, 
since this often does not lead to a statistical probability for future accidents.
44 Similarly, the 
availability of insurance also undermines the theory of corrective justice. Although the victims 
are being compensated for their injuries, the money is coming from insurance companies and not 
the manufacturers who are responsible for the injuries.
45 Ultimately, the remaining principle of 
the law of torts is the compensation of injured individuals. This principle has survived centuries 
of legal development and is immune to the current rise of insurance schemes that serve to 
undermine modern theories of tort liability.  
II. Federal Regulation of Pharmaceutical Drugs and Medical Devices 
A. Introduction of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
  Amidst the expansion of tort liability in the 20th century arose greater federal regulation 
of industry as well. In 1938, Congress enacted the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which 
significantly increased the oversight capabilities of the Food and Drug Administration.
46 
Previously, the FDA could only react to debacles that were caused by unsafe drugs.
47 The 1938 
Act, however, contained an important new provision providing for premarket review of new 
                                                 
43 See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY 163-164 (1997). 
44 See id. 
45 See O’Connell & Robinette, supra note 40, at 147. While some scholars argue that the existence of insurance for 
individuals also undermines the compensatory function of tort law, they tend to overestimate the extent and 
adequacy of coverage. See, e.g., Douglas H. Cook, Personal Responsibility and the Law of Torts, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 
1245, 1266-1267 (1996). 
46 Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1761 
(1996). 
47 Id. 9 
 
drugs.
48 This shift in the burdens of the drug safety oversight process was actually made in 
response to a contemporaneous tragedy in which a medicine containing diethylene glycol killed 
nearly one-hundred individuals and sickened hundreds more.
49 Congress evidently signaled its 
intention to supplement existing state laws with a federal regulatory power aimed at preventing 
similar drug safety problems.
50  
  The 1962 Drug Amendments to the FDCA provided the FDA additional oversight 
capabilities resembling those enjoyed today, at least in the new drug arena.
51 Of particular 
significance, the new drug amendments converted the premarket notice system into one for 
premarket approval.
52 Under the former system, the FDA required companies to notify the 
agency about new drugs; but absent any challenges based on safety concerns, a manufacturer 
could sell a drug without explicit agency approval.
53 The drug amendments, however, made it 
unlawful to market a new drug without prior FDA approval.
54 Furthermore, in addition to safety 
assessments, premarket approval also required a finding that the new drug is effective for its 
intended use.
55 This new Congressional mandate led to a risk-benefit analysis in which the FDA 
compares the safety of a new drug with the benefits it would provide to society.
56 Despite this 
balancing act, the FDA has acknowledged its gatekeeper role and responsibility in preventing 
drug-related injuries.
57 Indeed, like the impetus for the 1938 Act, the new powers in the 1962 
                                                 
48 Id. at 1761-62. 
49 Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185, 186 & n.18 (1971).  
50 This attempt at supplementing state tort remedies with federal oversight was replicated in many other areas of 
consumer protection and perhaps reached its height in the 1960’s-1970’s. See Robert S. Adler & Richard A Mann, 
Preemption and Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV. 895, 895-96 (1994).  
51 James To. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished 
Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 950 (2008). 
52 Merrill, supra note 46, at 1764-65.  
53 Id. at 1765. 
54Id. 
55 O’Reilly, supra note 51, at 950.  
56 Merrill, supra note 46, at 1765, n.37.  
57 Id. at 1768. 10 
 
drug amendments were granted, at least in part, in response to another tragedy involving a 
dangerous drug.
58  
B. The Medical Device Amendments 
  In 1976, the FDA’s expanded regulatory powers were extended to medical devices.
59 
This broadening of the agency’s oversight of health care products was significant because of the 
lack of attention that had previously been paid to medical devices. In fact, until 1938, medical 
devices were not regulated at all by the FDA.
60 And in 1962, when drugs were subjected to 
premarket approval requirements for safety and effectiveness, medical devices remained 
exempt.
61 While the 1976 amendments did not entirely apply the premarket approval 
requirements for new drugs to medical devices,
62 it did establish a regulatory regime that 
improved upon the agency’s previously ad hoc regulatory efforts.
63  
Specifically, the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 divided medical products into 
Class I, Class II, and Class III devices.
64 Class I devices are only subject to “general controls” 
because they do not “present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”
65 Class II devices 
are subject to “special controls” because the “general controls” applied to Class I devices are 
“insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.”
66 
Finally, Class III devices are regulated in an analogous way to new drugs. Such devices, 
                                                 
58 Id. at 1764, n.35. 
59 Id. at 1800. Like so many other substantial modifications of the FDCA, the addition of the Medical Device 
Amendments was, in part, a response to a product safety debacle. In particular, the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device 
caused thousands of injuries to otherwise healthy young women. See David C. Vladeck, The Problem of Medical 
Drugs and Devices: Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 103 (2005).  
60 Merrill, supra note 46, at 1801. 
61 Id. at 1803-04. 
62 Id. at 1809. 
63 See id. at 1807 (describing the FDA’s attempt at regulating some medical devices as “new drugs” under the 1962 
amendments, while realizing this application would not be possible or practical for many other potentially dangerous 
devices).  
64 Id. at 1809; Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 344 (2001).  
65 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)(a)(1)(A). 
66 Id. § 360(c)(a)(1)(B). 11 
 
therefore, are subject to premarket approval requirements for safety and effectiveness because 
they are intended to support, sustain, or prevent the impairment of human health, or they “present 
an unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”
67 
The three-part classification of medical devices was a sensible acknowledgment of the 
reality that many of these products do not interact with the human body – and consequently do 
not pose any threat to human health – in a way that most drugs do.
68 The premarket approval 
requirements for Class III devices, however, have proven largely irrelevant since its creation, due 
to an exception known as the 510(k) process that was incorporated into the Medical Device 
Amendments.
69 Any devices that were already being marketed at the time of the amendments 
would not be subjected to premarket approval requirements.
70 Furthermore, any devices created 
after the amendments that are “substantially equivalent” to these pre-existing “predicate” devices 
would also be exempt.
71 In addition, the FDA also made the 510(k) process available to devices 
that were “substantially equivalent” to these “substantially equivalent” devices.
72 In other words, 
devices that were substantially equivalent to pre-amendment devices could, in turn, serve as 
predicate devices for subsequent products. This avenue around the pre-market approval 
requirements continues to be attractive to medical device manufacturers today. After all, the 
“510(k) notification requires little information, rarely elicits a negative response from the FDA, 
                                                 
67 Id. § 360(c)(a)(1)(C). Some examples of Class III devices include “pacemakers, IUDs, artificial hearts, and 
artificial joints.” Robert Adler, 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction Needs Another Step 
in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511, 513 (1988). 
68 See Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 7 (1989) 
(stating that the dangers posed by medical devices “range from nonexistent to critical”). A representative example of 
a Class I medical device is a tongue depressor. Id. at 7 n.23 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 880.6230 (1988)). In addition, Class 
II examples include hearing aids and condoms. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 874.3300(b)(2) and § 884.5300, respectively).  
69 See J. Derrick Price, FDCA Medical Device Amendments and Federal Preemption: Putting the Screws to Spinal 
Fusion Patients, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 83, 87 (2002). 
70 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A). Note that this exemption was not meant to be permanent; rather, the FDA was 
responsible for classifying and eventually implementing regulations that would govern all pre-amendment devices as 
well as post-amendment substantially equivalent devices. See Adler, supra note 67, at 514. 
71 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B). 
72 See Merrill, supra note 46, at 1819 (noting that this process was known as “piggybacking.”). 12 
 
and gets processed very quickly.”
73 Indeed, the vast majority of medical devices are marketed 
under the 510(k) process.
74 Consequently, most medical devices, whether they are relatively 
innocuous or pose substantial risks to human health, are subjected to something more closely 
resembling a premarket notice system rather than the premarket approval system that is enforced 
with respect to new drugs.
75  
C. Effect of Legislation on State Tort Law 
Despite the expansion of federal regulatory requirements with respect to drugs and 
medical devices, individuals continued to be injured by these products and courts continued to 
entertain their lawsuits based on various state tort law theories.
76 For nearly seventy years, courts 
refused to hold that state tort actions for allegedly defective drugs are preempted by the FDCA,
77 
though compliance with federal regulations could be presented as evidence that the product was 
not defective.
78 Indeed, the legislative history for the 1938 Act seems to clearly indicate that 
                                                 
73 Adler, supra note 67, at 516.  
74 Leflar, supra note 68, at 28. In 1986, for example, 4,338 devices were approved via the 510(k) process while 72 
devices were subjected to the more stringent premarket approval process. Adler, supra note 67, at 515-16. 
75 See Leflar, supra note 68, at 28-29. Note that the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 did impose the increased 
burden on manufacturers of having to wait for a finding of “substantial equivalence” by the agency before such 
devices could be marketed. Merrill, supra note 46, at 1830. In addition, the overall situation may finally be changing 
as a result of pressure to subject the pre-amendment devices to the premarket review process. See Lisa Richwine, 
U.S. FDA Demands Data on Older Medical Devices, (Apr. 8, 2009), at http://www.boston.com/news/ science/ 
articles/2009/04/08/us_fda_demands_data_on_older_medical_devices; Older Medical Devices to Get FDA Review, 
BOST. GLOBE, April 9, 2009, at 9 (stating that 25 types of previously exempt, Class III medical devices are now 
being reviewed for safety and effectiveness by the FDA). The FDA will review these devices to determine whether 
they should be subjected to the premarket approval process or re-classified as a Class I or II device. See Medical 
Devices; Order for Certain Class III Devices; Submission of Safety and Effectiveness Information, 74 Fed. Reg. 
16,214 (April 9, 2009).  
76 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195-96 (2009) (“As it enlarged the FDA’s powers to ‘protect the public 
health’ and ‘assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs,’ Congress took care to preserve state law.”);  
see generally, David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, Health Regulation and Governance: A Critical Examination 
of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO L.J. 461 (2008); James T. O’Reilly, Drug Review 
“Behind the Curtain”: A Response to Professor Struve, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075-1076 (2008).  
77 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1017 & n.11, 1018-1019 & n.16 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
78 This is the majority view, though some courts and states view such evidence as establishing a rebuttable 
presumption that the product is not defective. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory 
Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1023-24 (2007). 13 
 
Congress did not intend to displace state tort suits with the proposed regulatory regime.
79 In 
addition, the FDA consistently disavowed any attempt at preempting state tort law with its 
regulations on drug safety.
80 In 2006, however, the FDA reversed its position and actively 
advocated a pro-preemption stance.
81 This change in policy, in turn, precipitated a newfound 
vigor in manufacturers to argue that product defect claims were impliedly preempted by the 
FDCA.
82  
One key difference between the statutory language governing drugs and medical devices 
has led to a somewhat different fate for the latter category of products. The 1976 Medical Device 
Amendments included a preemption provision that states, in part, that no state may “establish or 
continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement which is 
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this Act to the device. . . .”
83 
Nevertheless, most courts treated medical devices similarly to drugs; that is, regulatory 
compliance could be asserted as a defense, but it could not shield manufacturers from state tort 
claims asserting product defects.
84 In fact, most courts did not entertain the preemption theory for 
medical devices for well over a decade after the enactment of the 1976 amendments.
85 In the first 
major case concerning medical device preemption in the Supreme Court, the FDA expressed its 
belief that “damage remedies in a tort action” are also not preempted by the Medical Device 
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amendments that were incorporated into the FDCA, notwithstanding the preemption provision in 
the statute.
86 Indeed, it is certainly arguable that Congress did not intend to preempt such claims, 
given the prevalence of state tort lawsuits at the time of passage and the ambiguous language 
used in the statute.
87  
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
88 however, the 
landscape for medical device preemption changed dramatically.
89 In Cipollone, the plaintiff filed 
claims against several cigarette manufacturers on the grounds that certain design defects caused 
the decedent to die from lung cancer.
90 The relevant federal statute governing cigarette labeling 
contained a preemption clause that barred states from imposing “requirements or prohibitions” 
with respect to “the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes.”
91 The Court proceeded to hold 
that the state tort claims at issue were preempted because they constitute “requirements or 
prohibitions” within the meaning of the Act.
92 Following this decision in 1992, the vast majority 
of lower courts preempted state tort claims against medical device manufacturers because the 
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relevant preemption clause also included the “requirements” language deemed pivotal in 
Cipollone.
93 
III. From Lohr to Levine – The Supreme Court Rules on Preemption under the FDCA 
  In Cipollone, the Supreme Court opened the floodgates to preemption decisions in 
products liability cases. Consequently, the Court was faced with growing conflicts over the 
precise application of preemption principles to particular products. Unfortunately, the Court’s 
“resolution” of these cases has been characterized as incoherent
94 and even schizophrenic.
95 
Certainly, the result of Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area has led to some inconsistencies 
and an unpredictable future for consumers who are injured by drugs and medical devices. The 
Court initially showed sympathy and a desire to ensure that injured consumers could maintain 
state tort claims in the face of federal regulatory schemes. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, for 
example, the Court upheld a state damages award for radiation exposure despite broad and 
practically exclusive federal regulation of nuclear power plants.
96 In so doing, the Court paid 
special attention to the fact that preemption would have left the injured plaintiff without any 
remedy at all: “It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means 
of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”
97 During the same term, the Court 
denied certiorari in another case where preemption of state tort claims based on an inadequate 
label for pesticides regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency was rejected.
98 The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals had stated that the “provision of tort remedies to compensate for 
personal injuries ‘is a subject matter of the kind [the] Court has traditionally regarded as properly 
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within the scope of state superintendence.’”
99 Not long after the Supreme Court decided 
Cipollone, however, it began applying its preemption jurisprudence to the realm of products 
regulated by the FDCA. As a result, a consumer’s ability to recover damages based on state tort 
claims became less certain.
100  
A. Medical Devices 
1. Medtronic v. Lohr 
In Medtronic v. Lohr, the plaintiff claimed that Medtronic’s pacemaker, which had been 
marketed under the 510(k) process, was defective and injurious to her health.
101 Three years after 
being implanted with the Activitrax, Lora Lohr had to undergo emergency surgery when the 
pacemaker suddenly failed.
102 According to the treating physician, the failure occurred as a result 
of a defective lead, which is “the wire carrying electrical impulses from the pacemaker to the 
patient’s heart tissues.”
103 Lohr filed several claims against Medtronic based on strict liability 
and the negligent design, manufacture, and warnings related to the Activitrax pacemaker.
104  
As an initial matter, the Court stated several guiding propositions, which have since 
become familiar phrases in preemption cases. First, “because the States are independent 
sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-
empt state-law causes of action.”
105 Second, “’the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touch-
stone’ in every pre-emption case.”
106 Next, the Court examined the preemption clause for 
medical devices, which prohibits states from “establish[ing] or [continuing] in effect with respect 
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to a device intended for human use any requirement which is different from, or in addition to, 
any requirement applicable under this Act to the device. . . .”
107 It then held that a finding of 
“substantial equivalence” under the 510(k) process, even for Class III devices such as the 
Activitrax, does not constitute a “requirement applicable under this Act.”
108 According to the 
Court, this premarket notice process focuses more on “substantial equivalence” than safety or 
effectiveness.
109 Thus, the FDA did not impose any requirements with respect to the design of 
the pacemaker. Furthermore, the 510(k) process merely preserved the status quo for pre-
amendment devices until regulations governing them could be promulgated.
110 Since the status 
quo for medical devices at the time of the amendments included liability for state tort claims, 
Congress did not intend to displace them with this process.
111 In sum, “[g]iven this background 
behind the ‘substantial equivalence’ exemption, the fact that ‘the purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case, and the presumption against pre-emption . . . the 
‘substantial equivalence’ provision did not pre-empt the Lohrs’ design claims.”
112 
The Court also held that the manufacturing and labeling claims were not preempted by 
the FDCA. For purposes of the preemption provision, the Court found that FDA requirements for 
manufacturing and labeling the pacemaker were merely general requirements that were not 
“specific to the device.”
113 The Court, however, left the door open to future findings of 
preemption if a state requirement, even if general in nature, has the effect of “establishing a 
substantive requirement for a specific device” that is subject to specific federal regulations.
114 
While the Court did not provide any examples to illustrate such a situation, it did reiterate that 
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the state-based claims at issue in the case were not preempted because they only imposed general 
duties on manufacturers to use due care to avoid foreseeable dangers and to inform users of the 
risks associated with their products.
115 In addition, the Court held that state negligence per se 
claims were not preempted because they are not “different from, or in addition to,” federal 
regulations.
116 The Court reasoned that such claims “merely [provide] another reason for 
manufacturers to comply with identical existing ‘requirements’ under federal law.”
117 
Ultimately, in spite of an explicit preemption clause governing medical device regulation, 
the Court broadly upheld the Lohrs’ state tort claims against Medtronic for its defective 
pacemaker. A plurality even noted that “given the critical importance of device specificity” in 
the preemption clause, “it is apparent that few, if any, common-law duties have been pre-empted 
by this statute. It will be rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law cause of action to issue a 
decree that has ‘the effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device.’”
118 
This four-Justice plurality also strongly disagreed with Medtronic’s contention that any common 
law duty is a “requirement” that must be preempted under the FDCA.
119 According to the 
plurality, such a view is “implausible” because it would mean that “Congress effectively 
precluded state courts from affording state consumers any protection from injuries resulting from 
a defective medical device.”
120 
2. Riegel v. Medtronic 
  In Riegel v. Medtronic, the Supreme Court was presented with another opportunity to 
clarify the preemption doctrine with respect to medical devices. In this case, a physician used 
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Medtronic’s Evergreen Balloon Catheter to dilate Riegel’s coronary artery after he suffered a 
heart attack.
121 The actual use of the catheter in Riegel’s case was contraindicated by the 
product’s label, both because Riegel’s heart had calcified stenosis and because the physician 
inflated the catheter beyond the maximum pressure indicated as being safe.
122 In fact, the 
catheter ruptured and blocked the heart, necessitating the use of life support and an emergency 
bypass surgery.
123 Riegel subsequently filed state law claims asserting that the catheter was 
inadequately designed, manufactured, and labeled under theories of negligence and strict 
liability.
124 
  The Court first established that unlike the pacemaker at issue in Lohr, the catheter here 
was marketed under the premarket approval process in which the FDA examines the device for 
safety and effectiveness.
125 Thus, the catheter was subject to specific federal requirements 
concerning its design, manufacture, and labeling.
126 The Court also departed from Lohr in 
finding that state tort claims can be considered, and in fact are, requirements within the context 
of the preemption provision for medical devices.
127 The Court characterized tort judgments as 
indicating violations of state-law obligations.
128 According to the Court, “while the common-law 
remedy is limited to damages, a liability award ‘can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method 
of governing conduct and controlling policy.’”
129 Consequently, Riegel’s state tort claims were 
preempted by the FDCA because they imposed requirements different than the ones imposed by 
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the FDA through the premarket approval process.
130 Conversely, however, the Court reiterated 
the specific holding in Lohr that negligence per se claims based on a breach of federal 
requirements, though not at issue in Riegel, are not preempted by the Act.
131  
  In Riegel, Justice Ginsburg was alone in carrying the mantel of compensation for injured 
victims of defective products, a concern previously espoused by other Justices. While Justice 
Ginsburg agreed with the majority that negligence per se claims should not be preempted, she 
was additionally concerned about “consumers injured by devices that receive FDA approval but 
nevertheless prove unsafe.”
132 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that Congress only 
intended to preempt state agency regulations that were beginning to emerge throughout the 
country at the time of the Medical Device Amendments.
133 As for state tort claims, “[w]here the 
text of a preemption clause is open to more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept 
the reading that disfavors pre-emption.’”
134 Justice Ginsburg, accordingly, presumed that 
Congress did not intend to additionally preempt such claims, especially since it did not 
simultaneously create a federal compensatory remedy.
135 In other words, “[i]t is ‘difficult to 
believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse’ for large 
numbers of consumers injured by defective medical devices.’”
136  
  The Riegel Court fulfilled its warning in Lohr that some state tort claims may constitute 
requirements for purposes of the preemption clause. Indeed, in Riegel, the Court preempted a 
large swath of state tort claims that are based on the inadequate design and labeling of medical 
devices that have received premarket approval from the FDA. The practical effect of this ruling 
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will become even more severe as the FDA embarks on its recent initiative to subject all Class III 
medical devices to the premarket approval process for safety and effectiveness.
137 Once 
complete, lawsuits such as the one upheld in Lohr and numerous other cases will be preempted, 
leaving injured victims without a remedy. Although displeased with the Court’s holding in 
Riegel, Justice Ginsburg noted that the case did not address the scenario in which a consumer is 
injured because of a product defect that was not evident at the time of premarket approval.
138 
This remark proved to be somewhat prescient, since the Court would address this issue in its next 
term with respect to pharmaceutical drugs. 
B. Pharmaceutical Drugs 
  1. Wyeth v. Levine 
  In Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court applied its preemption analysis in the realm of 
pharmaceutical drugs, which are not subject to the express preemption clause that governs 
medical devices. In this case, Donna Levine went to a local clinic to receive treatment for a 
migraine.
139 She received shots of Demerol for her headache and Phenergan for her nausea.
140 
When this treatment did not provide relief of her symptoms, Levine received additional 
Phenergan through the alternate method of an IV-push.
141 Phenergan’s warning label noted the 
potential for gangrene if the drug comes into contact with arterial blood, which is a risk when 
using the IV-push method.
142 The label further stated that the IV-drip method is preferred, 
whereby the drug is diluted in a saline solution before entering the patient’s vein.
143 The label did 
not, however, specifically note that the IV-drip method would generally avoid the risk of 
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gangrene, a finding that was made by the trial court.
144 In fact, the IV-push administration of 
Phenergan caused gangrene in Levine’s arm because some of the drug came into contact with 
arterial blood.
145 Consequently, Levine’s hand, and then arm, were amputated to prevent further 
injury.
146 Levine subsequently filed claims against Wyeth, the manufacturer of Phenergan, under 
state tort theories of negligence and strict liability for failing to warn against the use of the IV-
push method.
147 In rejecting Wyeth’s argument for preemption, the Vermont trial court found 
that the FDA permitted a company to strengthen its warnings, at least pending agency review, 
that the FDA did not seriously consider any proposed warning against IV-push for Phenergan, 
and that “state law serves a compensatory function distinct from federal regulation.”
148 The 
Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, noting the ability of Wyeth to unilaterally strengthen its 
warning against the IV-push method without FDA approval and its belief that, in any event, 
“federal labeling requirements create a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation.”
149  
  Since there is no relevant preemption clause, Wyeth argued that Levine’s claims should 
be impliedly preempted either because it would have been impossible to comply with both the 
state and federal labeling requirements
150 or because the state law judgment served to frustrate 
the FDA’s decision about the safety and effectiveness of Phenergan.
151 The Supreme Court 
dismissed the first contention on the same basis as the Vermont Supreme Court; that is, under 
FDA regulations, Wyeth was permitted to change its label to correspond to newly evident or 
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perceived dangers.
152 Since Levine presented evidence that Wyeth was aware of a significant 
number of gangrene cases involving the IV-push method for Phenergan, the jury could 
reasonably hold Wyeth liable for failing to warn of this possibility.
153  
The Court also rejected Wyeth’s second preemption defense. Wyeth argued that state jury 
verdicts – finding FDA-approved labels to be inadequate – frustrate the intent of Congress to 
entrust the FDA to strike the appropriate risk-benefit balance for new drugs.
154 Thus, according 
to Wyeth, FDA’s approval constitutes “a floor and a ceiling for drug regulation,” and therefore, 
state tort claims to the contrary are preempted.
155 The Court, however, inferred from the lack of a 
federal remedy that Congress intended to preserve “state rights of action [to provide] appropriate 
relief for injured consumers.”
156 The Court also cited the FDA’s previously long-standing 
support of state tort law as a supplement to its regulations, necessitated in part by a chronic lack 
of resources.
157 According to the Court, such a stance was sensible for the additional reasons that 
state lawsuits can uncover unknown drug hazards and “also serve a distinct compensatory 
function. . . .”
158 
The Court never stated that all state tort claims against drug manufacturers would 
overcome a preemption defense, even in cases like Levine’s involving failure to warn claims. 
Indeed, the Court noted near the end of its opinion that part of Wyeth’s preemption argument 
was undermined by the fact that “the FDA did not consider and reject a stronger warning against 
IV-push injection of Phenergan.”
159 The Court seems to imply that had the FDA done so, the 
state jury verdict finding the label inadequate for not including a more stringent warning could 
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be preempted. Indeed, the Court ended its opinion by stating: “Although we recognize that some 
state-law claims might well frustrate the achievement of congressional objectives, this is not such 
a case.”
160 Just as the Court had left the door open in Lohr for a future holding in favor of 
preemption, the Levine opinion’s closing statements seem ominous. 
2. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc. 
The extent of the recent holding in Levine will only truly be known as more cases with 
similar, though significantly different, facts are decided. The Levine Court stated that “absent 
clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change to Phenergan's label, we will not 
conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state 
requirements.”
161 Thus, an obvious candidate for further clarification in this area would be a case 
in which the FDA did reject a specific warning that a state jury subsequently deemed necessary. 
In Colacicco v. Apotex, the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed two consolidated cases 
concerning failure to warn claims for SSRI anti-depressants.
162 The plaintiffs in these cases filed 
claims on behalf of decedents who committed suicide after taking these types of drugs, claiming 
that the deaths resulted from a reaction to the drugs and not the underlying depression.
163 The 
claims and defenses asserted were similar to the Levine case; however, in Colacicco, there was 
evidence that the FDA had specifically considered the risk of suicide from taking this class of 
drugs. Indeed, according to the court, the “FDA has actively monitored the possible association 
between SSRIs and suicide for nearly twenty years, and has concluded that the suicide warnings 
desired by plaintiffs are without scientific basis and would therefore be false and misleading.”
164 
In other words, manufacturers would violate federal law if they modified their labels to include 
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warnings about the risk of suicide related to using these drugs. The Court of Appeals, therefore, 
held that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted because it would have been impossible for 
manufacturers to abide by federal law if they had changed their labels in accordance with the 
state jury verdicts. According to the court: 
Because  the  standard  for  adding  a  warning  to  drug  labeling  is  the  existence  of  ‘reasonable 
evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug,’ and the FDCA authorizes the FDA to 
prohibit false or misleading labeling, a state-law obligation to include a warning asserting the 
existence of an association between SSRIs and suicidality directly conflicts with the FDA's oft-
repeated conclusion that the evidence did not support such an association.
165  
 
  Colacicco was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v. Levine. In fact, 
both cases were granted certiorari by the Supreme Court for the same term. The Supreme Court, 
however, vacated its previous grant and remanded Colacicco to the 3rd Circuit “for further 
consideration in light of Wyeth v. Levine.”
166 Ironically, the 3rd Circuit’s opinion in Colacicco 
had specifically distinguished the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v. Levine, which 
was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Specifically, the 3rd Circuit distinguished Levine on 
the basis that Wyeth could have complied with federal and state law because the warning that the 
state jury deemed necessary was not assessed and rejected by the FDA, unlike the suicide 
warning at issue in its case.
167 Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision to remand could mean that in 
light of the rationale used in its decision of Levine, it did not view the distinction made by the 3rd 
Circuit in Colacicco as compelling. Indeed, the Supreme Court employed broad language at 
times in viewing Congressional intent to preserve the coexistence of state tort claims with FDA 
regulations.
168 However, it largely referred to this history in the context of undermining Wyeth’s 
reliance on the FDA’s recent policy reversal in favor of preemption.
169 Furthermore, the Court 
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never explicitly embraced the second aspect of the Vermont Supreme Court’s holding, which 
was based on the belief that “federal requirements create a floor, not a ceiling, for state 
regulation.”
170  
The Court’s focus in Levine on whether it was possible for Wyeth to comply with the 
state jury verdict and federal labeling requirements also seems to suggest that it does not view 
the FDA’s explicit determination as a floor that can be supplemented by state tort claims for 
inadequacy. In other words, throughout its argument, the Court implicitly accepted that state jury 
verdicts for failure to warn impose requirements on the drug’s manufacturer; therefore, the Court 
concedes that such requirements can conflict with federal labeling requirements.
171 In fact, the 
Supreme Court seemed to leave the door open to cases like Colacicco when it expressly refused 
to comment on the type of fact pattern that is really at issue there.
172 As noted above, the Court 
stated in Levine that the case did not involve a situation where the FDA had specifically 
considered and rejected the warning deemed necessary by the state jury verdict.
173 Consequently, 
it remains unclear whether failure to warn claims based on risks that the FDA explicitly 
considered and rejected are preempted.  
C. Critical Considerations 
1. A Threshold Inquiry 
The Court’s preemption decisions were only made possible by its concurrent 
determination that state tort law and jury verdicts constitute requirements that can conflict with 
federal regulations. Without this presupposition, there would be nothing for federal law to 
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preempt, aside from state statutes and regulations. The Court has been inconsistent in this regard, 
and its settled interpretation seems far from compelling. In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, for 
example, the Court stated that “a requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an event, such 
as a jury verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a requirement.”
174 And yet 
three years later, in Riegel v. Medtronic, the Court informed Congress that it would generally 
interpret the term “requirements” as encompassing state tort claims and jury verdicts.
175  
It is unclear whether this latest pronouncement by the Court will constrain any future 
cases that rely on the interpretation of the term “requirements;” in any event, the reasoning is 
certainly not convincing. A tort-based jury verdict “would not require the manufacturer to do 
anything other than pay money damages.”
176 This view is consistent with the compensatory 
function of tort law. The effects of a jury verdict on a manufacturer’s behavior, if any, are 
indirect.
177 They certainly should not be viewed as having the force or characteristics of a true 
regulation. At best, a jury verdict may influence the behavior of manufacturers, who might 
attempt to avoid future tort awards by taking added precautions or implementing various 
measures to educate consumers about the potential dangers associated with their products.
178 But 
the manufacturer can also do absolutely nothing, and choose to pay the award as a cost of doing 
business.
179 Ultimately, “the level of choice that a defendant retains in shaping its own behavior 
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distinguishes the indirect regulatory effect of the common law from positive enactments such as 
statutes and administrative regulations.”
180 
2. The Outlook for Consumers 
In the end, the Supreme Court has provided additional guidance for courts deciding cases 
involving tort claims against drug and medical device manufacturers who assert preemption 
defenses. Unfortunately for consumers, the availability of compensation for injuries has been 
eliminated in many of these cases and become uncertain in others. With respect to medical 
devices, the Court made the pivotal decision in Riegel to interpret the term “requirements” in the 
preemption clause as encompassing state tort law and jury verdicts. Consequently, any state-
based claims implicating a Class III medical device, which is subject to specific federal 
requirements, is preempted by the FDCA. In other words, the devices most likely to cause an 
injury because of their nature are now immune from liability. While Justice Ginsburg claimed in 
her dissent that the case did not address a scenario in which product defects come to light after 
FDA approval, the majority opinion never conceded this point. Thus, it is far from clear whether 
or not her contention will prove to be prophetic at some point in the future. 
The preemption jurisprudence on pharmaceutical drugs is not much clearer than with 
respect to medical devices. While the former category of products is not subject to a preemption 
clause, the Court could achieve the same result in Riegel in a drug case using an implied 
preemption analysis. Thus, using the facts from Colacicco, the Court could determine that the 
state-law requirement – in the form of a tort law verdict – frustrates the FDA’s risk-benefit 
decision in rejecting an added warning for suicidality to the drug’s label. In this scenario, both 
Class III medical devices and drugs could be immune from liability, unless the alleged design 
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defect surfaces after agency approval, though this has yet to be decided by the Court with respect 
to medical devices. Ultimately, a significant number of consumer-patients currently have no 
recourse if they are injured by a medical device. In addition, a substantial number of 
pharmaceutical drug consumers may be left uncompensated if the Court finds that an explicit 
rejection of a strengthened warning label by the FDA impliedly preempts state verdicts to the 
contrary.
181 
IV. The Problem of Compensation 
A. Congressional Intervention 
Having noted some objections to the Supreme Court’s decisions described above, this 
section addresses where we should go from here, having to live with the current preemption 
landscape for FDA-regulated drugs and medical devices. The Riegel Court clearly offered one 
option. In conceding the ambiguity of the term “requirements,” as used in the medical device 
preemption clause, the Court put Congress on notice as to how it would interpret this usage. 
According to the majority opinion, “Congress is entitled to know what meaning this Court will 
assign to terms regularly used in enactments. Absent other indication, reference to a State’s 
‘requirements’ includes it common-law duties.”
182 Thus, the Court invited Congress to take 
action if it disagreed with how its term was being interpreted. Indeed, Congress has introduced 
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legislation that would effectively overturn Riegel and reinstate tort liability for all medical device 
manufacturers.
183 
Aside from restoring a compensatory remedy for injured consumers, there are additional 
powerful policy arguments that would support Congressional action here. Two of the more 
notable, and practical, considerations focus on the lack of agency resources and the nature of 
assessing the true safety profile of a drug or medical device. The actual risks associated with a 
new drug or medical device can only be known after it has been introduced to the general 
population, which is much larger and more diverse than the participants of a clinical trial.
184 
Thus, FDA approval of a drug or medical device does not guarantee safety, nor does it even rely 
on a truly accurate risk-benefit analysis since all of the potential hazards remain unknown. 
Furthermore, because of budget constraints and other factors, the FDA only employs 100 
individuals to monitor and detect adverse events associated with more than 11,000 different 
drugs and medical devices that have been approved by the agency.
185 The FDA is therefore ill-
equipped to require modifications to a warning label or to withdraw approval of a product in a 
timely fashion. Because of these inherent limitations in the FDA’s ability to ensure the safety of 
all pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices, Congress has a strong argument for preserving the 
co-existence of state tort law and federal regulatory oversight. Alternatively, Congress could 
provide some sort of federal remedy that would similarly accomplish the compensatory goals of 
state tort law. 
B. No-Fault Compensation 
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Rather than restore the status quo, some commentators advocate an alternative to 
traditional state tort liability that would arguably be more fair to both consumers and 
manufacturers. In a perfect world, all pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices would only have 
benefits and no inherent risks. In reality, no drug or device is absolutely safe; thus, when “the 
FDA approves the marketing of a drug it tacitly acknowledges that some users will be 
injured.”
186 From the vantage point of society as a whole, a utilitarian risk-benefit analysis 
reveals that “some injuries are not worth avoiding.”
187 Clearly, then, “the regulatory perspective 
is not a compensation perspective.”
188 Proponents of no-fault compensation schemes are 
concerned about the welfare of the unlucky individuals who do not benefit from pharmaceutical 
drugs and medical devices, but rather, suffer significant injuries that may or may not have been 
foreseeable by manufacturers or the FDA.
189 These proponents do not believe that such injuries 
should go uncompensated and considered acceptable losses merely because the majority of 
consumers benefit from a given drug or device.
190 
Administrative no-fault schemes have been implemented with varying success in several 
different fields, including the workplace, automobile accidents, and childhood vaccinations. This 
type of compensation system has several advantages over the traditional tort system. First, it 
ensures that all victims, regardless of fault, are compensated for their injuries.
191 Second, a well-
designed system will achieve greater efficiencies for both injured individuals and 
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manufacturers.
192 For instance, no-fault administrative schemes inherently avoid protracted 
litigation, thereby reducing the cost of legal fees and resulting in quicker payments to injured 
individuals.
193 Finally, such schemes are also designed to produce a more equitable distribution 
of compensation by ensuring that all injured individuals receive payments and by preventing 
windfalls that are often comprised of exorbitant punitive damages.
194 
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986 could be used as a 
model for a no-fault compensatory scheme for pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices. The 
Act generally provides tort immunity to vaccine manufacturers by making it difficult for an 
individual to maintain an action in state court.
195 It also sets a minimum threshold for the severity 
of a vaccine-related injury that can be compensated. Thus, individuals are only entitled to 
compensation if they suffer side-effects for more than six months or require hospitalization and 
surgery.
196 In addition, surviving claimants are entitled to compensation in the case of  an 
individual’s death resulting from a vaccination.
197 The Act provides for the streamlined 
adjudication of claims conducted by special masters, who must render a decision within a 
timeframe not much longer than a year.
198 This is made possible, in part, because claimants need 
not prove the critical issue of causation if the injury is associated with the particular vaccine 
listed on the Vaccine Injury Table.
199 Claimants seeking damages for an unlisted injury, 
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however, face the more burdensome task of proving causation.
200 Successful claimants in either 
case are compensated from a fund that relies on a seventy-five cent tax on each dose of 
vaccine.
201 The Act limits such awards to $250,000 for injuries or death and forbids punitive 
damages.
202 
Applying the vaccine no-fault scheme to pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices 
would resolve some concerns from both manufacturers and victims alike. As previously stated, 
manufacturers would have more uniform and predictable liabilities and injured consumers would 
be guaranteed compensation in most cases. One of the rationales for creating the no-fault scheme 
for vaccines also readily applies to pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices; that is, all of these 
products serve a useful function in society, but they also cause a significant number of injuries as 
well.
203 A no-fault scheme seems to be a workable compromise at insulating the manufacturers 
of needed drugs and devices while also ensuring reasonable compensation for related injuries. 
This type of an alternative to traditional tort liability seems even more compelling in the case of 
a drug or device that has a particularly high value to society, but nevertheless continues to pose 
risks as well.
204 An agency such as the FDA could perhaps designate drugs and devices as being 
subject to the no-fault scheme based on a risk-benefit analysis. If the drug or device exceeds a 
threshold utility to society, then it could be protected from traditional liability by being placed in 
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the no-fault class of products.
205 All other drugs and devices would be subject to normal tort 
liability.  
The precise details of a worthwhile no-fault administrative scheme for pharmaceutical 
drugs and medical devices is beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, there are certainly reasons 
why it would be inadvisable to apply the no-fault scheme for vaccines to drugs and medical 
devices, due to some significant differences between these types of products and the intended 
recipients.
206 The broader point, however, is that useful drugs and medical devices can be 
protected and encouraged without foreclosing all modes of compensation for injured individuals. 
Regardless of whether Congress intended to preempt claims against medical devices, and in light 
of the possibility that courts will continue to dismiss other claims against drug manufacturers on 
the basis of implied conflict preemption, some form of a compensation scheme can and should 
be established to provide for innocent victims who are injured by these products. 
Conclusion 
  For nearly 800 years, the common law has recognized an injured person’s right to be 
compensated. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the common law adapted to the increasing 
complexity of societal interactions by abandoning the requirements of privity, and in some cases, 
culpability. In the field of products liability, courts recognized that individuals should not bear 
the costs imposed by manufacturers, who are in a better position to monitor the safety of their 
products and to spread losses. In response to several notable tragedies, the federal government 
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began regulating the safety of pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices before they reached the 
public. Meanwhile, state tort law continued to provide compensatory relief for injuries that were 
not prevented by the FDA. Thus, state tort law and federal regulations combined to provide 
increasing protection to consumers while preserving a compensatory remedy for injuries. The 
early part of the 21st century, however, has seen this balance upset by the Supreme Court’s 
preemption jurisprudence. By perceiving state compensatory judgments as a form of regulation 
on manufacturers, the Court has preempted state tort judgments against many medical device 
manufacturers and may do so with respect to manufacturers of pharmaceutical drugs as well. 
Since Congress did not provide a federal remedy under the FDCA, however, many consumers 
are no longer entitled to compensation for their injuries. This development is at odds with the 
longstanding history of tort law and the relatively recent trends of both state and federal law to 
provide more protection to consumers. In order to avoid this unjust result, Congress must restore 
a compensatory scheme for injured consumers. Whether through traditional state tort liability or 
a no-fault system, consumers should not be foreclosed from recovering for injuries due to 
inherently dangerous pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices.  